Universities and the state: “undesirable” education, ideology, and pressure

Russian version

The state sees students as a resource and starts the 2025/26 academic year by escalating repression

After the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the climate within the universities and colleges changed — the state injects the education with ideology, assigns discriminatory statuses, and subjects people to incarceration using bogus court cases. Prohibition of books, lectures, specific topics, and movies has now become usual. The state sees students as a resource to boost the demographics and ease the staffing shortage caused by the war.

In this study, we have looked into cases of violation of academic freedom and destruction of the autonomy of the universities, as well as identified the trends of higher education in Russia at the beginning of the academic year 2025/26.

Who prepared this research

This research was conducted by “Molnia” (“Lightning”) — a human rights advocacy group for Russian students. For three years, “Molnia” has been providing free legal help for the students of Russian universities and registering cases of pressuring the students for their civic activities and self-expression: unruly expulsions, scholarship revokation, intimidation of being conscripted, prejudice during exams, dispersing of student associations, and denunciation to authorities.

This research has grown from the project called “Map of academic freedom violations”. Currently, you can see every violation reported to us between 2022 and 2025; for convenience, we split them into several categories: political agitation, unruly expulsions, pressure on student councils, and others.

Methodology

We studied over 500 cases of violation of academic freedom of faculty and students in colleges and universities from September 2024 to August 2025. The study is based on the advocacy work of “Molnia” as well as open sources: reports by media (“Groza”, “7x7”, “Mediazona”, “T-invariant” and others), analysis conducted by other civic groups (“Sfera”, “OVD-info”), messages on the websites and in social media of the educational organizations. The data were automatically parsed, manually checked, and processed afterward.

We did not restrict the geography of this study, but we received the most messages from the regions where both media and the institutions of student self-organization operate effectively: this helps publicize the cases of violation of academic freedom. We do realize that many such cases do not attract any media attention; however, the ones that do enable us to come to conclusions about the dynamics of oppression of the academics and better understand how its mechanisms work.

Report structure

Our research includes an analysis of 14 identified trends concerning the rights of professors and students, as well as the state of autonomy of educational institutions. It is structured as follows:

In Part I, we describe the policy changes in the field of higher education — we talk about “sovereignization,” “foreign agents”, and “undesirability” as a way to combat disloyal professors, the complete destruction of the autonomy of educational institutions, and the tendency to view professors as mentors who have to teach students the “right” values.

In Part II, we discuss how the state is making certain topics forbidden (in particular, queer studies) and the pressure on vulnerable groups in the academic community — migrants, young men of conscription age, young women who are being pressured to give birth, and those who do not support the political decisions of the state and the actions of educational institutions.

In Part III, we examine evidence that the state perceives students as a resource at the expense of which it is possible to correct demographics and satisfy the personnel shortage.

In the concluding section of the report, we noted the restrictions in the field of education that came into force on September 1, the first day of the new academic year.

Ideology and the War on Dissent

“Sovereignization” of Russian Education

In the mid-2010s, Russian universities faced censorship and restrictions on the rights and freedoms of students and faculty, but on the whole, they operated with far greater freedom than they do now. The 2012 Law on Education proclaimed the autonomy of educational organizations, the academic rights and freedoms of faculty and students, and information transparency and public accountability as basic principles of state policy in the field of education.

The law granted faculty the freedom of creative academic work, the right to participate in developing curricula and in the governance of their educational organizations, including through trade unions, and the right to independently choose their teaching methods, as long as they respect the dignity of students. The law gave students the right to create their own individual study plans, to transfer to other universities and colleges, to participate in the governance of their educational institution, and to undertake internships and studies, including as part of academic exchanges with foreign countries. The law explicitly prohibited forcing students to join public associations and political agitation within universities.

The Law on Education is aligned with the universally accepted values of universities proclaimed as part of the Bologna Process, which Russia joined in 2003. The country was on a path of Europeanization and modernization of its education system. Russian universities entered into foreign partnerships (for example, Bard College and Smolny College, the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, and the University of Manchester). Leading Russian universities hired foreign professors and carried out international projects, and research findings were published in international journals.

Ten years later, virtually nothing remains of these university rights and freedoms. Russia is withdrawing from the Bologna Process, and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education is constructing a new model for higher education, claiming the “sovereignization” of Russian education.

Russia's withdrawal from the Bologna Process and the designation of several educational organizations as “undesirable” have significantly curtailed cooperation between Russian universities and their European and American counterparts. The number of joint research projects has decreased, and the academic mobility of students and faculty has plummeted. The Ministry of Science and Higher Education has recommended that universities cease participation in the EU-funded Erasmus+ academic mobility program.

European organizations are also withdrawing from cooperation. For example, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) scholarship program has restricted its cooperation with Russian universities, although it has stated its readiness to continue individual collaboration with scholars and students, calling it “one of the last bridges for civil society.” The German Alexander von Humboldt Foundation also maintains ties with former stipendiaries, although it does not hold events in Russia.

As a result, engagement with European partners has sharply declined. For instance, in 2018, 4,000 students from Russia received DAAD scholarships, compared to only 500 in 2022. Contacts between educational programs, students, and faculty have shifted from the institutional to the personal level, a move initiated by both Russian authorities and Western institutions.

It's not to say that academic mobility with foreign countries is currently impossible. While partnership with Europe and the U.S. is significantly restricted and carries substantial risks (more in the subchapter on the trend of “undesirability”), educational cooperation is simultaneously developing with Belarus, Vietnam, China, Colombia, Mexico, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Brunei, Iran, and North Korea. Programs with Hungary and Serbia were organized already after the start of the war against Ukraine. Russia continues international educational cooperation, but on a smaller scale and with a reorientation toward “friendly” countries. Conversely, collaboration with universities from “unfriendly countries” is shrinking. This will diminish the quality of scientific knowledge in Russia.

The authorities aim to control the international contacts of scholars. In the summer of 2025, a law was passed requiring researchers to enter data about planned scientific projects involving foreigners into an information system. The Federal Security Service (FSS) will monitor these projects. Research conducted under the state defense order, projects containing state secrets, and those carried out in the interests of the Ministry of Defense, Rosgvardiya, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the FSS, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not be included in the system.

The tradition of a close link between higher education and the FSS is rooted in the Soviet period, when First Departments existed in scientific institutes. FSS personnel seconded to Russian universities continue to operate there today. The heightened control over international ties increases the FSS’s role within universities even further.

Russian education and science are being sealed off from international cooperation along several fronts: withdrawal from the Bologna Process, control over cooperation with foreigners, “undesirability” designations, and “foreign agent” status. All these together form an iron curtain against Europe and the U.S. and are aimed at combating “hostile” knowledge.

More “Undesirable Organizations” and the Increase in Restrictions against “Foreign Agents”

In 2015, a provision on “undesirable organizations” was introduced into Russian law. It allows the Prosecutor General's Office to declare virtually any foreign organization undesirable. “Undesirable organizations” cannot operate in Russia, and individuals face persecution for cooperating with them. In 2024, a record number of organizations (65) were added to the list of “undesirable” ones, and from January to August 2025 another 63. At least 56 of all “undesirable organizations” are connected to education. The number of “undesirable educational organizations” is growing annually.

The first organizations in the field of education to be designated as “undesirable” were Bard College and the Oxford Russia Fund (ORF). This resulted in the dismantling of the prestigious Smolny Faculty at St. Petersburg State University (SPbU), of which Bard College was a long-time partner. Scholars faced prosecution for cooperating with the ORF. Literature published by the foundation was publicly destroyed by university activists.

The list of “undesirable organizations” includes:

• Universities (Yale, CEU, Bard College)
• Scholarship programs (Institute of International Education, which administers the Fulbright Scholarship Program);
• Organizations that conduct language courses and English language proficiency exams (Education First, British Council).

The concept of cooperation with “undesirable organizations” can be interpreted extremely broadly. Studying and paying for courses, or possessing literature published by these organizations, may be considered financing or participating in the activities of an “undesirable organization”. Administrative and criminal liability, including imprisonment, is provided for these actions.

The designation of educational organizations as “undesirable” undermines academic mobility, creating a new “iron curtain” between Russian universities and leading foreign educational and research institutions. These actions are consistent with the policy of abandoning the Bologna system and the “sovereignization” of Russian education.

Not only are “undesirable organizations” under prohibition. Lecturers designated as “foreign agents” are barred from the educational process, and their careers are jeopardized.

As of September 1, 2025, 71 scholars and lecturers are on the “foreign agents” list. Their professional activity is effectively prohibited. In 2022, “foreign agents” were banned from teaching minors, and as of September 1, 2025, teaching and enlightenment activities are prohibited even for adult audiences. This new restriction has already affected independent educational platforms. For example, the “Stradarium” (Suffering) Russian platform with courses on humanities topics was forced to delete lectures by “foreign agents.”

The status of “foreign agent” essentially blocks the freedom to teach. For this reason, professors Yulia Galyamina, Vitaly Kovin, and Mikhail Lobanov were dismissed from universities. Among the restrictions associated with “foreign agent” status are those of a more hidden nature. For example, the number of citations of a “foreign agent” scholar's academic works decreases. This may be linked to bans on citing “foreign agents.”

Demolishing of Independent Universities and Treason Cases

In 2025, two independent educational institutions, the European University at St. Petersburg (EUSPb) and the Moscow School for Social and Economic Sciences (also called “Shaninka”), lost their independence. The EUSPb has been forced to collect humanitarian aid for the war and dismiss opposition-minded professors, while “Shaninka” has been banned from enrolling students for the new academic year.

Administrative pressure on universities began as early as the 2000s. The state employed various tools to “tame” overly independent educational institutions: revoking licenses, fines for possessing literature published by “undesirable organizations,” pressure-induced dismissals of faculty, closing of research centers, checking students' work for “extremism,” and even criminal cases against a university president.

Despite the prestige of these educational institutions, by 2025, they too were forced to fully align with authoritarian state policy. The European University sent a vehicle for the needs of the Russian army and received a letter of gratitude from a military unit commander. The EUSPb was fined 250,000 rubles (≈ €2640) for research on forensic examinations in Russia, under the article on inciting hatred and enmity.

In April 2025, it became known that “Rosobrnadzor” (the Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science) had banned Shaninka from admitting students for the new academic year. According to the agency, “Shaninka” lacked higher education programs and specialized faculty, and students showed low performance in diagnostic tests. In July, university president Sigova stated at a meeting with students that they “do not have much faith that we will win in court against Rosobrnadzor.”

In October, “Shaninka” may have its accreditation and educational license revoked.

This would result in the university being unable to issue state-recognized higher education diplomas.

Criminal and administrative cases are being initiated against professors and scholars. Sometimes, researchers are accused based on students’ denunciations. These cases are not usually related to the professors' academic activities. In many ways, these are attempts to restrict civil liberties for the population as a whole, rather than specifically for the teaching community. Repressions against professors impact the academic community: the persecution of one lecturer creates a “chilling effect” on the others.

Scholars who have access to classified information or are engaged in science-intensive technical research face particular risks. For example, in September 2024, Alexander Shiplyuk, head of the Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was sentenced to 15 years in a maximum security penal colony on charges of high treason. He was one of three scientists convicted in a case involving the transfer of classified data to China. Also imprisoned on high treason charges are Valery Golubkin, Valery Mitko, Alexey Vorobyov, and others. All of them were engaged in research activities. Since the beginning of the war, the number of convictions for espionage has increased 24-fold.

University administrations employ extrajudicial methods of pressure. For example, right before the start of the 2024-2025 academic year, St. Petersburg State University (SPbU) did not renew the employment contract of Yuliana Kaminskaya, a PhD in Philology, who had supported Svetlana Drugoveyko-Dolzhanskaya, who was dismissed for criticizing a commissioned expert analysis in the case of former political prisoner Sasha Skochilenko. At the same time, Novosibirsk State University (NSU) did not renew its long-term contract with philosopher and historian Nikolai Rozov, presumably because of his “Russophobic comments.” Linguistics professor Elena Berezovich of Ural Federal University (UrFU), the biggest university in the Ural region, and Fedor Uspensky, president of the Vinogradov Russian Language Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), were not approved during the elections as members of RAS due to a letter against the war in Ukraine that they signed in 2022.

University administrators are essentially duplicating the state, deciding who to pressure and for what. The autonomy of higher education is completely absent.

It is not only researchers at traditional universities who face persecution, but also public educators. For example, the Yeltsin Center canceled a lecture by philosophy popularizer Dmitry Khaustov because of a post in Vladimir Solovyov's Telegram channel — the propagandists disliked that the philosopher had demonstrated a pro-Ukrainian stance. The same venue also canceled a lecture by literary critic Alexander Arkhangelsky due to his “foreign agent” status — this occurred even before the law banning “foreign agents” from conducting educational activities came into effect.

Education Means Upbringing. Universities and Ideology

Before the start of the 2025-2026 academic year, Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education Olga Petrova stated that the task of higher education is to cultivate “professional patriots.” Starting in 2022, ideological disciplines have appeared in universities and colleges—about the “Russian world,” the hostile “West,” and a righteous war.

In 2024, the Higher Political School (HPS) at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH) was named after Ivan Ilyin, Vladimir Putin's favorite philosopher. The school is headed by Alexander Dugin, a propagandist and ideologue of the “Russian world.” The very functioning of the HPS within the university is a clear violation of academic freedom. According to its founding documents, the Ilyin School “shapes the worldview of students based on Russian civilizational identity and traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.” Its activities are aimed at indoctrinating students with the ideology of Putin's political regime. Dugin and the HPS have proposed reforming the political science curriculum to convince students that Russia's current political system is ideal and that liberalism is dangerous.

The controversial renaming of the HPS led to the emergence of the student movement “RSUH against the Ilyin School,” whose participants faced pressure. As a result, the spontaneous movement, which was supported by students and the public, began to cooperate with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and was renamed the Student Anti-Fascist Front. Some of its members took part in a CPRF congress, where they spoke on behalf of the movement about “the fighters who laid down their lives in the special military operation.”

Many “patriotic” organizations are created at the initiative and with the immense support of the state. Centers of the “Movement of the First,” on which one billion rubles (≈ 10.6 million euros) are to be spent in 2025, are planned to be opened in all universities across the country. The association “Ya gorzhus” (I am proud), as of 2023, included 398 patriotic clubs; in 2025, 94 million rubles (≈ 993 thousand euros) are to be spent on it. However, some of these clubs are fictitious: not a single student is a member of them.

Universities regularly become platforms for propaganda, giving the floor to military personnel (MSU, ChelSU, KFU, and many others), war correspondents [in Russia, those are usually war supporters or journalists working at government-funded media] and journalists, pro-government singers, pro-life activists, “representatives of law enforcement agencies,” and informants. Students are forced to attend pro-government lectures. Creative festivals are dedicated to the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland.

Professors are forced to engage in the “upbringing” of students: they are recommended to organize meetings with military personnel and war correspondents who will speak about the “essence of Ukrainian neo-Nazi ideology.” Universities are required to inspect their libraries and remove books that “discredit and falsify” the history of Russia.

In 2024, Rosmolodezh (the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs) and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education launched the “Voice of a Generation” project for university vice-presidents for youth policy and professors. Its goal is to develop a model of “upbringing” that will foster patriotism in youth and students. It is proposed that university professors be made into mentors or moral guides for students. Instead of transmitting critical thinking skills, a state-encouraged indoctrination of students is taking place; a pseudo-patriotism is instilled in them, which amounts to unconditional support for state policy.

The creation of an “independent” Russian education system is accompanied by the appearance of politicized educational programs. In 2023, the discipline “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” was introduced in universities, in which students are taught about Russia as a civilization, the “Russian world,” and other propaganda clichés.

Since the beginning of the war, educational programs related to the production and maintenance of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) have been appearing in universities and colleges (MIPT, TSU, MAI, BMSTU, RTU MIREA). Universities with such programs receive grants for research and development projects related to drones. Joint programs with drone manufacturers are also being launched.

Other programs are related to the transmission of “correct” humanitarian knowledge and the fight against “fakes” and “information wars.” At RSUH, a course on “Westernology” has been developed under the leadership of Alexander Dugin to “put an end to the satanic Western civilization.” At MGIMO University, a master's program in “Strategies of Information Influence in International Relations” has been launched; one of the announced guest lecturers is Maria Zakharova, the head of the information and press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and a supporter of the ongoing war in Ukraine. This program appears to be implemented with the support of the presidential administration, and the best graduates can apply for work there.

On behalf of Vladimir Putin, universities are admitting participants in the war in Ukraine. At RANEPA, a special personnel training program for public authorities was opened in 2024. This is not higher education, but a retraining program for future managers, usually lasting about a year. RANEPA used to graduate city mayors and governors; now it also teaches war veterans.

The appearance of such a program signals the state's intention to create a “new elite” from the military and integrate them into government bodies. In 2025, many regions launched similar programs (“Time of the Heroes of St. Petersburg,” “Heroes of the East” (Khabarovsk Krai), “Zaporozhye Heroes” (Zaporozhye Oblast)). Moreover, there are plans to open new educational institutions to train future cadets — at least 15 such institutions are set to appear within the next nine years.

Ideology is also being pushed into textbooks. For instance, a textbook on “destructology", based on Vladimir Putin's decree on “traditional values”, was published. The expert analysis of this textbook's author, Roman Silantyev, formed the key argument of the case against Berkovich and Petriychuk.

State Duma deputies have called for preventing the “distortion of common history” in the textbooks of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, after discovering that in many of them, the Soviet experience is assessed negatively. The author of a new journalism textbook for universities, Alexander Malkevich, a deputy of the St. Petersburg legislative assembly, believes that responsibility for “fakes” must be tightened, praises Vladimir Solovyov and Dmitry Kiselyov, famous Russian propagandists, and criticizes “Novaya Gazeta” (New Newspaper) and “Ekho Moskvy” (Echo of Moscow) for “anti-patriotism.”

PRESSURING VULNERABLE GROUPS

LGBTQ+ Against Traditional Values

On the annual Rainbow Map published by ILGA-Europe in 2025, which assesses the observance of rights for LGBTQ+ people in 49 European countries, Russia ranked last. Following the recognition of the “international LGBTQ+ social movement” as an “extremist organization”, any association with this community carries heightened risks.

What is an “extremist organisation”?

The criminalization of LGBTQ+ people means that researchers of gender and queer theory are endangered. For example, a denunciation was filed against two scholars for asserting that gender is not binary. In the summer of 2025, several regional universities received a warning for the alleged dissemination of materials promoting “LGBTQ+ values” by professors at the behest of the “undesirable” Oxford Russia Fund; one of whom faced administrative charges.

According to calculations by Yana Kirei-Sitnikova, the number of published studies on trans medicine has decreased by 68% since 2021. Prior to this, the number of scientific articles on the topic had been steadily growing since 2017. Homophobic laws have led to a reduction in research in this area. Scholars are afraid to publish queer studies, and journal editors refuse to accept articles on these topics. According to calculations by journalists at “7x7” (a Russian media outlet that covers what happens in Russian regions), the number of scientific publications supporting homophobia grew significantly in 2024.

Ideology is penetrating universities that were once considered independent: the research plan of the Higher School of Economics now includes academic work on “traditional values.” This is in line with state policy aimed at spreading patriotism, the idea of service, and family values. In universities, “moral guardians” are emerging from the student body. For example, the university president of Moscow State Linguistic University advised a student, Paraskeva Trofimova, to report to the administration about “LGBTQ+ propaganda” within the university walls. Trofimova participated in the harassment of students who, in her opinion, belonged to the LGBTQ+ community, and threatened to have them sent to the war in Ukraine. The university administration supports the harassment of students who may be connected to the LGBTQ+ community.

The government has assigned the functions of patriotic, spiritual, and moral education to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. In 2025, the former head of the Federal Security Service, Nikolai Patrushev, took charge of promoting “traditional values” among young people and counteracting “the destructive informational influence of the West” — he is heading the corresponding project for the “United Russia” party, the ruling party that supports Putin.

The promotion of traditional values in higher education is indoctrination. Instead of fostering critical thinking, universities are being forced to engage in imposing “traditional values”. Universities have ceased to be safe spaces where the harassment of people for belonging to any particular group is not tolerated.

Illegal Literature

In the 2024-2025 school year, the pressure on libraries, independent publishing houses, and bookshops only grew — it is so when it comes to scientific, educational, and fiction literature. Repressions against book businesses have resulted in growing risks for researchers and students.

As a part of the 2022 campaign against “the spreading of LGBTQ+”, Andrey Baev (the head of online library Bookmate) and Andrey Dokuchaev (former CEO of Individuum Publishing and Popcorn Books, a youth publishing house) were proclaimed “foreign agents” for publishing queer book “Pioneer Summer”. The pressure on the book business has only grown since the “LGBTQ+ movement” was proclaimed as “extremist”. In 2025, employees of the Individuum publishing house were raided in connection with a case involving LGBT+ “propaganda.” The publishing house's managers are accused of participating in the “activities of an extremist organization” and were added to Rosfinmonitoring's list of extremists in September.

Book business representatives are accused of spreading queer literature: two reports on “Novoye literaturnoye obozrenie” (New literature review) (the first and the second) and one on “Ad Marginem”. Independent bookstores are fined: “Podpisnie izdaniya” (Periodicals) has to pay 800 thousand rubles (≈ 8200 euros), and “Falanster” — 900 thousand (≈ 9200). Publishers and sellers of anarchist literature are also subjected to repression.

To protect themselves, publishing houses and distributors are sending lists of books to bookshops for immediate removal from sale. “Torgovyi Dom BMM” (Trading house BMM) requested the withdrawal of books by Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, while “Alpina” is pulling titles by “foreign agents” (Mikhail Zygar, Andrey Zubov, Tamara Eidelman), books on sex education, and works by Eduard Limonov. The Samokat publishing house asked that some of its books, including a comic on the history of feminism, not be distributed.

In connection with changes to the “foreign agent” legislation, the Russian Book Union announced that from September 1, 2025, bookstores selling literature by “foreign agents” will lose rental benefits and become ineligible for state financial support.

Pressure is being applied not only to publishers and booksellers but also to libraries. Their directors are fined for storing books with the logos of “undesirable organizations.” Such books are demonstratively destroyed, for instance, the deputy head of the trade union organization at Volgograd State Pedagogical University seized books printed with the involvement of the “undesirable” Oxford Russia Fund. Libraries' public spaces are being turned into venues for propaganda events.

Over 2024–2025, queer books, literature on sex, and feminism have been banned.

The number of protocols and fines for selling books significantly increased in 2024–2025.

The rules governing publishers and booksellers are not always clear, prompting the book business to act pre-emptively by removing literature that is not yet formally prohibited. This policy pushes researchers and students toward self-censorship to avoid possible persecution and repression.

Anti-Migrant Policies in Universities

A new trend in Russian education is the spread of anti-migrant policies in schools and universities.

Russia publicly declares its openness to foreign applicants, recruiting them and opening preparatory faculties in Zambia, Tanzania, and Ethiopia for future study in Russian universities. Yet, an unfavorable climate for migrants is forming simultaneously. For example, foreign students at Ural Federal University (UrFU) must report on their university attendance and dormitory residence every 72 hours. This rule discriminates against foreign students, making them unequal to Russians. The administration justified the rule by citing an increase in migration law violations. The Federal Security Service even detained the director of UrFU's examination center for “organizing illegal migration of foreigners”, through which migrants could obtain residency documents. Following this, the university changed its policy. At least four of the twelve criminal cases opened against university presidents in 2025 are linked to organizing illegal migration through university enrollment.

University administrations often neglect the rights of foreign students, exploiting their vulnerable position. For instance, North-Caucasus Federal University (NCFU) forced students to transfer to universities in the territories bordering Ukraine, specifically Kursk and Belgorod. Students who refused to transfer held a protest. The protest was dispersed by security forces, who later conducted raids on dormitories with the university administration, checking foreigners' passports and verifying participation in the protest. Some foreign students were subsequently expelled.

In 2024, Vladimir Putin ordered an increase in the number of foreign students in Russian universities to at least 500 thousand people. Nevertheless, all foreigners are subject to substantial state control. In 2025, migrants must provide biometrics to obtain a SIM card. Migrants in Moscow and the Moscow region have to register in a special application that tracks geolocation. Furthermore, migrants can be expelled from the country without a court decision for labor law violations. The pressure on foreign students goes hand-in-hand with a broader anti-migrant policy, creating additional restrictions and risks for foreign students.

Expulsions for Political Reasons

2022 marked a peak year for political expulsions, with 52 students unlawfully expelled from universities and colleges (mostly in Moscow and St. Petersburg). In 2023 and 2024, 31 students were expelled each year. In 2025 (January-August), 40 students were expelled, 35 of whom were foreigners.

However, these figures do not provide a complete picture of political persecution against students. Students rarely tell the media about their expulsions, and journalists infrequently cover these stories. The actual number of political expulsions may be significantly higher. The chart only records public cases and appeals to the “Molnia” (Lightning) hotline.

The reason for persecuting students is often their social media posts. For instance, a student at Belgorod University of Cooperation, Economics and Law was expelled allegedly for a joke involving a swastika posted in a Telegram story. Three students from Stroganov Moscow State University of Arts and Industry were expelled for a published video showing them twerking in front of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. Orthodox activists from the “Sorok Sorokov” (Forty Forties) movement reported the girls, who were subsequently held liable under the article concerning offending the feelings of believers.

Under the education law, universities cannot expel students for behavior outside the university. Yet, students often face double jeopardy for their actions — legal (administrative or criminal liability) and disciplinary (expulsion from the university). This contradicts the legal principle of non-bis in idem and violates students' rights.

The largest mass expulsion in 2025 involved 35 foreign students removed for refusing to transfer to universities in Belgorod and Kursk as instructed by the administration. These expulsions occurred against a backdrop of dormitory raids and passport seizures involving the police. The pressure on foreign students contradicts Russia's declared openness to students from other countries (more in the subchapter on “sovereignization” of Russian education).

Pressure on student political associations is increasing. For example, the Trotskyist Artyom Pronyko was expelled from St. Petersburg State University (SPbU) before the court ruling on his guilt in illegally organizing a rally for the “Science is Dead” protest, organized by the political organization “Rabochaya Vlast” (Workers' Power): a mannequin of Minerva was hung on the monument to Sergei Uvarov near the Twelve Collegia building, the main building of St. Petersburg State University.

Pronyko was detained directly during classes. He denied involvement, and the event organizers corroborated his statement. SPbU student Harry Azaryan was accused of incitement to terrorism for a speech at a “Rabochaya Vlast” congress; at the time of this research's publication, the student is in a pre-trial detention center. Stepan Timofeev, a student at Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University (LETI), received administrative arrest for his alleged participation in the same action. The pro-government RIA Novosti reported that “Rabochaya Vlast” is managed from Great Britain. Following the start of the persecutions, the political organization announced its dissolution.

Changes in Compulsory Military Service

Following the results of the autumn conscription (October 1 to December 31, 2024), human rights defenders reported a tightening of round-ups. For example, a student in Moscow was taken to the military enlistment office in handcuffs. The human rights project “Idite Lesom” (Go by the forest) recorded 170 round-ups, almost double the number in the autumn 2023 conscription. Draft notices were handed out in colleges and universities and in dormitories. Raids involving military police were conducted in educational institutions. In 2024, round-ups occurred in places frequently visited by students, such as computer clubs.

Students who were not registered for military service had their access passes blocked, preventing them from attending classes. Even before the start of the conscription campaign, universities were delaying the issuance of study certificates, which are necessary to formalize a student deferment. By manipulating documents and citing workload, universities may be aiding the military enlistment office, which aims to draft as many conscripts as possible. This puts students in a vulnerable position.

The spring conscription (April 1 to July 15, 2025) had a record target number of conscripts. 160,000 young men were slated for compulsory service (95% of this number was reached).

In July 2025, the Ministry of Defense began sending out notifications “on inclusion in the military registration registry.” In August 2025, a Kazan student reported that the university forced him to log in to the registry, which was found not to contain the information about his active deferment from 2023 to 2027. If a draft notice were delivered to the student through the registry during this period, it would be considered served, and the conscript would be liable for failing to report to the military enlistment office. They could face restrictions and a ban on leaving Russia (we reported on the electronic draft notice system).

To speed up conscription and meet the plan, universities may coerce students into logging into the registry. This action transfers all data from the State Services portal (Gosuslugi) to the electronic registry. Similarly, universities assisted military enlistment offices by blocking passes for students who failed to visit the offices on time.

But lawyers also note a positive trend: Moscow courts are overturning almost one in ten draft notice decisions issued by military enlistment offices. This suggests that contesting the actions of the military enlistment offices can have a positive effect.

In July 2025, deputies Kartapolov and Krasov introduced a bill that would allow conscription activities to be held throughout the year, not just during conscription periods. If passed, students without a deferment will participate in conscription events (such as medical examinations) at any time, regardless of the draft schedule, starting January 1, 2026. This will increase pressure on students, as conscription activities will effectively run year-round, allowing more conscripts to be drafted.

Legislative changes, the launch of the registry, and the tightening of round-ups make students' position even more precarious. These practices lead to violations of students' rights and endanger their lives.

Reproductive Pressure

In 2024, many regions promised material support for young student families and female students planning to give birth. According to “7x7”, at least 40 regions have introduced or plan to introduce payments, typically around 100,000 rubles (≈ €1060). The most generous payments are in Chelyabinsk, where full-time female students were promised up to 1,000,000 rubles (≈ 10.6 thousand euros). In the Ulyanovsk region, female students can receive a one-time payment of 200,000 rubles (≈ €2110) for childbirth. Before the 2025–2026 academic year, payments to pregnant students were raised to the minimum subsistence level (they were equal to the scholarship before).

Authorities are using other tools to motivate women to have children. For example, senators proposed giving additional points for university admission to female applicants with children, counting it as an individual achievement.

Reproductive pressure is not limited to payments. Students are given lectures on “family values and against “infanticide.” For instance, clergymen told medical students that “life begins at conception, so abortion is murder,” and showed embryo models. Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church spoke at a conference at Velikiye Luki Medical College, campaigning for procreation and against abortion.

At least 13 universities screened the movie “Mama's Letter,” created with the support of the propagandistic Orthodox TV channel “Spas” (Savior): a young woman learns of her pregnancy and is torn between giving birth and having an abortion. She finds herself in a “supportive” environment where she is advised to give birth, while the Church promises to help. The film ignores the difficulties of motherhood and emphasizes the role of religious institutions in raising a child. In another video shown to female students and high school girls, a voiceover from the perspective of an embryo persuades the girls not to have an abortion.

While monetary benefits can be viewed as an expression of the state's social role, the suggestion that one must have children and that abortion is evil can pose a real danger. Propagandists advocating for increased birth rates rarely discuss the real challenges of motherhood with students. Discussion of these topics contradicts the state's line on solving demographic problems. The propaganda of an ideal image of motherhood can mislead young women and men and constitutes a serious state interference in the personal lives of young people. Sex education should focus on other issues — such as sexual literacy — to reduce the possibility of sexually transmitted infections, for example.

The prospect of early childbearing is highly likely to jeopardize the careers of young people. Meanwhile, the state is deliberately pushing young women toward “preserving the hearth.” For example, a Ministry of Health official suggested that girls should give birth earlier rather than pursue higher education.

STUDENTS AS A RESOURCE

Quotas at the expense of state-funded places

Applicants can enter universities not only through general competition but also through quotas. The quota for targeted admission is set as a percentage of state-funded places by the state itself. For example, in 2025, the “Radiophysics” program had a 20% targeted-admission quota. The “Military Journalism” program could recruit only targeted-admission students, with no state-funded places at all.

This practice is also widespread in medical universities, where a significant number of state-funded places are allocated to targeted admission. For example, in 2025, 27 out of 78 residency programs had no state-funded places at all — they were all targeted. Moreover, in 31 programs, the targeted-place quota exceeded 50%.

Since 2022, there has also been a “special” admission quota, making up 10% of the state-funded places. This allows participants in the war in Ukraine and their children to enroll. Applicants under the “special” quota do not need to compete with other prospective students for the state-funded places. In 2025, 330 universities voluntarily increased this quota, resulting in over 50,000 places.

The practice of reallocating state-funded places in favor of quota-based ones means that the decisive factor in university admission is not ability but the applicant's social status. There are no barriers set for quota applicants — they are allowed to choose any program, even the ones they lack the necessary skills for (like English knowledge).

This policy discredits the achievements of young people who prepare for exams for years. Participation in the war becomes an alternative to the long preparation for admission to a prestigious university.

Tuition-based education is also becoming less accessible — in 2025, some universities increased fees by 50%. Starting next academic year, the number of tuition-based places may decrease due to a new distribution procedure. From the 2026–2027 academic year, their number will be centrally regulated, so the universities will not be able to take in more paid students than prescribed by the state. This change is linked to the desire to regulate the labor market — for example, to reduce the number of managers and increase the number of engineering graduates.

Coercion into Targeted Admission

In 2024, the targeted admission program was reformed: a single portal was created to house all offers from employers, students were allowed to apply to only one targeted admission offer, and it was forbidden to conclude such agreements with “foreign agents.” The changes were criticized even by university administrators, who pointed out that employers are not sufficiently involved in the targeted admission process, which leads students to sign contracts without full consideration, and more as a safety net, in case they do not pass the general competition.

In 2025, the state began using targeted admission to address personnel shortages. The Russian government submitted a draft law that obliges state-funded students in medical and pharmaceutical programs to conclude a targeted admission agreement. After graduation, these graduates must work for the customer organization, or, if they refuse, reimburse the cost of their education and pay a twofold fine.

If this bill passes, a medical graduate will not be able to obtain a license to practice without working in a state institution, which limits their ability to control their labor.

Targeted admission creates risks for students. For example, a targeted admission contract may stipulate the graduate's employment in any region, including occupied territories. A student signed a contract with such terms and, upon graduation, was required to work in Mariupol. She refused, which led the university to file a lawsuit seeking reimbursement of funds. In the court hearing, the student's defender argued that there was an ongoing military conflict in Mariupol and a risk to life and health, but the court did not accept these arguments. As a result, the court ordered the student to pay approximately 300,000 rubles (≈ €3170).

Targeted admission is becoming a way to somehow satisfy the staffing crisis in healthcare, which has been caused by the war in Ukraine, emigration, and the unattractiveness of working in state medicine (low pay, poor working conditions). If the attempt to convert all state funding for the training of medical students into targeted admission is realized, one can expect this model to be extended to other fields, as stated by Tatyana Solomatina, deputy chair of the State Duma's health protection committee. Against the backdrop of restrictions on paid places in universities, this idea becomes even more plausible.

Universities for the Front

The “Universities for the Front” campaign was launched by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 2023, and by November, the ministry claimed that 500 universities had joined the program. Only in some press releases did the Ministry of Science and Higher Education provide complete lists of the universities participating in a specific collection drive (for example, 1, 2).

We collected all mentions of universities in 12 press releases. After analyzing these lists, we found that in only one instance did 132 universities participate in a drive. The most frequent participant (10 times) was Moscow Power Engineering Institute. MIREA — Russian Technological University and Peoples' Friendship University of Russia collected humanitarian aid six times. A total of 150 universities took part in the campaign at least once. Thus, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education overstated the number of participants in the program by a factor of 3.3. However, some universities may use other methods to send humanitarian aid (for example, through the “MYVMESTE” (“WE TOGETHER”) project, the "Mosvolonter" center) or organize aid collections on their own initiative, rather than as part of the Ministry's campaign. Taking this into account, the number of universities participating in the collection of humanitarian aid may be higher.

In any case, in 2024-2025, the collection of humanitarian aid under the guidance of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education became an institutional practice. Universities are sending vehicles, trench candles, and camouflage nets to the combat zone.

Mass Student Surveys and Personal Data Collection

In 2024, the state began asking students questions about their sexual life and their attitudes toward the war and state policy. A fundamentally new trend has been the attempt to collect students' biometric data.

The surveys themselves do not violate students' rights, as long as they are not mandatory. But, for example, students at universities in Perm were asked to send the last page of a survey to their class monitors to report that they had completed the test. The anonymity of the answers is highly questionable, as it is often necessary to log in through social media to take the test.

Students' biometric data is being collected using government services. For example, at the Moscow State College of Information Technology and Economics (MGKEIT), the system for entering the university was changed: students were forced to submit facial biometrics, which they would use to enter the academic buildings, through the mos.ru website, and were promised that their card-based passes would be canceled. Previously, similar requirements were introduced at other universities (Russian State University of Cinematography, Tula State Pedagogical University), and those who refused to submit their biometrics had their university access blocked. Coercion to provide biometric data is not permitted by law.

NEW ACADEMIC YEAR — NEW REPRESSIONS

The new academic year began with new prohibitions coming into force. “Foreign agents” are now forbidden from teaching and engaging in educational activities — this change will affect independent educational projects where individuals with valuable expertise marked by this discriminatory status could give lectures. Students will find themselves increasingly cut off from knowledge that may not align with the current authoritarian policy.

Another blow was the introduction of liability for searching for “extremist materials.” This will lead to a narrowing of the scope of research. Human rights defenders point out that courts interpret “extremist materials” broadly — this includes not only materials from the special Register but also anything related to banned organizations and communities (from their members to their symbols). This law could bury or significantly restrict queer studies and the study of social movements and political thought, as well as become a tool for persecuting professors and students.

From September 2025, student and faculty chats may be transferred to a new messenger called MAX, promoted by the state (similar to the transfer of all school chats), which can take screenshots without the owner's knowledge and collect geolocation and other data. The unauthorized collection of information could make it easier to pressure students and professors due to easy access to their personal information through the messenger. The effective interaction between the MAX administration and law enforcement agencies has been cited as an advantage of this messenger. Experts say there is a risk of data being used without the owner's knowledge.

In the fall, regional elections are taking place. Professors and students are perceived as a resource that must vote remotely. Remote electronic voting raises concerns from experts regarding security and confidentiality, yet university administrations still insist on meeting quotas for the number of people who have voted via the system.

Control over foreigners will be strengthened — they will be monitored through special applications (for now, the requirement to install the program only applies to foreigners in Moscow and the Moscow Oblast). Geolocation data will also be collected from students. If this experiment is deemed successful, the requirement to install the application will likely be extended to foreigners throughout Russia.

These changes legalize the invasion of the private lives of students and professors and the control over their actions. They are aimed at ensuring that members of the academic community do not express dissenting views and stop studying topics that the state is desperately trying to prohibit.

Conclusion

In times of war, the state does not tolerate free thought and demands submission to new “values,” among which the value of academic freedom is absent.

As part of the “sovereignization” of education, Russia is abandoning international cooperation with Europe and the United States. Educational projects are increasingly being added to the list of “undesirable organizations.” In an attempt to restrict the teaching of subjects that do not align with “traditional values” and the authoritarian political course, the State Duma has banned “foreign agents” from teaching and engaging in educational activities. The state is trying to prevent the spread of alternative ideas and knowledge.

The state also delineates the boundaries of permissible research. Academic courses now include disciplines about the “rotten” West, Russian civilization, and other propagandistic constructs. This is done for the sake of the “correct” upbringing of Russian citizens — precisely the task that is now set before universities and colleges.

The destruction of prestigious educational institutions, to the point of being prohibited from enrolling students, shows that the existence of independent institutions in modern Russia is impossible. Due to the lack of autonomy, universities cannot consolidate and resist prohibitions on the study of certain topics, or refuse to host lectures by propagandists and informers. Those who do not fit into the prescribed framework of unconditional support for state policy are subject to expulsion, dismissal, or even imprisonment.

The state considers students a resource for the economy and the war. In medical schools, it is highly likely that only targeted admission places will remain — this is connected to the staffing shortage. Young women are being pressured to “fulfill their maternal duty” rather than realize their career ambitions. Young people are actively involved in the collection of humanitarian aid. Universities are cooperating with military enlistment offices, attempting to limit the right to a draft deferment.

The university admission process is becoming more difficult: the number of state-funded places is shrinking, while targeted admission quotas and quotas for participants in the war in Ukraine are increasing. The level of competition is rising, which makes free education increasingly inaccessible. Male students face the threat not only of losing their place in university but also of being sent to war due to the lack of an academic deferment.

In 2024-2025, pressure on foreign students intensified: they are required to submit attendance reports, and from September 2025, they will be obligated to install special applications to track their location. Outwardly, Russia continues to declare its openness to foreigners, but in practice, it is creating an unfriendly environment for studying.

The key trends in higher education remain unchanged: increased pressure on students and professors, the continued restriction of freedom of thought, and the growth of propaganda. We will continue to monitor violations of the rights of students and faculty.

Acknowledgments: The author thanks dear colleagues from “Molnia” for their expert comments and support, editors for their immense work, and the cat Funny for sharing her beautiful name.

Author: Cat Funny

Editor: Boris Grozovsky

Translation: Daria Manzhura

Notes

1. "Friendly" and "unfriendly" countries are the division used by the Russian government. Those who are considered "friendly" usually support Russia's aggression against Ukraine and have strong ties with Russia, sometimes helping it to avoid sanctions. "Unfriendly" countries are considered to be against the Russian invasion of Ukraine and try to limit the country's opportunities unless Russia stops the war. ^
2. The Federal Security Service is the successor of the Soviet KGB. It is one of the key authorities in modern Russia. Additionally, many of the current or ex-members of FSS become members of various governmental structures. ^
3. The common name of the Federal Service of Troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation. ^
4. The first departments were a part of the KGB. Among its functions was control of access to information considered state secret, of foreign travel, and of publications. ^
5. "Undesirable organizations" are the organizations whose work is considered to undermine Russia's constitutional order. As often happens in modern Russia with such terms, its use is vague and allows one to claim as "undesirable" any organization. ^
6. It was a SPbU and Bard College partnership — the first in Russia to be based on liberal education principles. That was an example of faculty that matched the principles of the Bologna Process. ^
7. "Iron curtain" is a term that first appeared during the Cold War between the USSR and its allies and Western Europe, with the U.S. Coined by Winston Churchill, the term described the political, ideological, and military barrier that restricted contact, travel, and the exchange of ideas between the two sides. This term is being used again in the context of the current division between Russia and its allies and opponents, represented primarily by the U.S. and Europe. ^
8. The Russian foreign agent law requires any person or organization receiving any form of support from outside Russia or deemed to be under foreign influence to register as a "foreign agent". Currently, it is a restrictive status. They are not allowed to teach or publish books. They are also obliged to present a report on their activity to the Russian government. ^
9. Both universities were established in the 1990s and had the status of private institutions. They faced pressure ranging from the revocation of their licenses (which prohibits universities from teaching students) to inspections by the Prosecutor General's Office of students' theses for “illegal” material. Teachers and rectors of these universities are being prosecuted in politically motivated cases. ^
10. A term in law meaning the indirect suppression of free expression due to the fear of negative consequences, such as legal punishment, social backlash, or retaliation. ^
11. The Federal Security Service prosecutes scientists more often than before. Some of the scientists have access to classified information. In some cases, they conduct research with foreign partners, and that becomes the reason for prosecution. ^
12. Educational, cultural, and civic center, which opened in Yekaterinburg in 2015. The center operates under the Law on Presidential Centers and was named after Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin. The deputy director of the center was fined under an article on discrediting the Russian army (this article is used to punish those who oppose the war in Ukraine). ^
13. He is a Russian propagandist. In Ukraine, he is accused of incitement to genocide and war mongering. ^
14. Russian religious and political philosopher, a supporter of the monarchy. He believed that the October Revolution was a "national catastrophe". Later in life, he became a main ideologue of the Russian All-Military Union. This organization believed that force stood as the sole means through which the Soviet regime could be toppled. ^
15. Russian officials and state-funded media avoided the term "war in Ukraine," and this term was widely used instead. ^
16. The Russian youth movement appeared in December 2022. Its stated goal is to organize leisure activities for youth and educate children, "including shaping their world views based on traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.” ^
17. The association of Russian student patriotic clubs. Its goal is to create conditions for "the upbringing of a harmoniously developed and moral individual". ^
18. Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Tomsk State University, Moscow Aviation Institute, Moscow State Technical University of Civil Aviation, Russian Technological University. Those universities are located in the European part of Russia. ^
19. Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration ^
20. In the original, the name includes the pun. East in Russian is "vostok," which contains the letter V — one of the symbols of the ongoing war with Ukraine. ^
21. Zaporozhye starts with Z — one of the symbols of the ongoing war with Ukraine. ^
22. The following are listed as "traditional values": life, dignity, human rights and freedoms, patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland and responsibility for its fate, high moral ideals, strong family, creative work, priority of the spiritual over the material, humanism, mercy, justice, collectivism, mutual assistance and mutual respect, historical memory and continuity of generations, unity of the peoples of Russia. There is no additional clarification on those values. ^
23. An intergovernmental organization that was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. ^
24. The activity of an "extremist organization" is strictly prohibited. For example, the Anti-Corruption Foundation, founded by Putin's main political opponent, Alexei Navalny, is considered an "extremist organization". At the same time, the Taliban was recently excluded from the list of such organizations. ^
25. Trans medicine provides medical care to transgender and gender-nonconforming people. It includes hormone therapy, surgery, general medicine, and other types of medical care. ^
26. A Russian University that has campuses in four major Russian cities. ^
27. A foreign agent is a toxic status that is often used as a form of political prosecution. Formally, it is given when a person or a legal entity gets foreign funding. However, in Russia, the possession of such a status is restrictive and limiting. For example, "foreign agents" are prohibited from teaching. ^
28. Rosfinmonitoring (Russian federal service for financial monitoring) is responsible for preventing money laundering and financing terrorism. All people who are accused of terrorist or extremist crimes are listed, even before being considered guilty. ^
29. These two cities are the regional centers of the two regions bordering on Ukraine. They are both unsafe and can become the targets of drone attacks. ^
30. Russian Orthodox traditionalist social movement. The movement is believed to be protecting biblical values and spreading anti-Western rhetoric. ^
31. The article appeared in response to the 2013 Pussy Riot's performance in the church for which they were prosecuted. The law is vague on what should be considered an offense and gives freedom of interpretation to prosecutors. ^
32. Literally: not twice in the same thing. A legal doctrine to the effect that no legal action can be instituted twice for the same cause of action. ^
33. There are many restrictions put on the organization of protests. Protesters have to obtain the official permission and the approved date, time, and details of the process. However, oftentimes the Russian government rejects such applications. ^